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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEILA R. BROWN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
THOMAS E. BROWN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7475 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and respondent agrees that the state-
ment of facts in appellant and defendant's brief is true 
with the following exception: On page 3 of appellant's 
brief is the statement that defendant had testified uthat he 
did not spend any part of his income on drink or enter-
tainment." Defendant did in fact testify that he went 
to two or three movies during the month of September, 
1949 (R. 52) and possibly some movies during October, 
1949 (R. 52) and that he sometimes took his new wife 
and her family. It is true that he later on testified that 
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he did not remember going to a movie· during October, 
1949 (R. 52), but he does not deny going. 
The Court must know the following facts also before 
determining the matter before the Court: 
As shown by the judgment upon an order to show 
cause of the same District Court dated January 6, 1949 (R. 
10-12) the defendant had been found guilty herein of 
contempt of court for failure to pay support money to 
plaintiff for the support of the two minor children of the 
parties and defendant had been sentenced to a ten day 
suspended sentence in jail and plaintiff had been given 
judgment for accrued and unpaid support money owing 
to her by defendant in the sum of $707.50 plus costs and 
$50.00 attorneys' fees. 
The defendant continued to ignore the order of Court 
(R. 13-15) and allowed the accrued and unpaid support 
money owjng under the decree to increase to $1,112.5 0 
plus costs. Thereupon, the second order to show cause· dated 
August 3, 1949 (R. 16, R. 18) was issued. On August 
15th, 1949, just a few minutes before the hearing on the 
latter order to show cause was to commence, Mr. Edward 
Clyde, defendant's counsel, contacted plaintiff, through 
her counsel, and advised plaintiff that defendant could 
never possibly pay the accrued and unpaid support money 
then due, and made, for his client, the following offer: 
That defendant pay $500.00 cash in full payment of the 
$1,112.50 unpaid and due support money and in full satis-
faction of the outstanding judgment which included costs 
and attorneys' fees, and that defendant be en~couraged to 
remain current by being given the financial incentive of 
having the monthly installment decreased from $60.00 a 
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month to $40.00 a month with the provision that if he 
defaulted and remained in default for thirty days the pay-
ments would automatically increase again to the former 
amount of $60.00 a month. The offer required the de-
crease in payments if defendant was to pay plaintiff the 
$500.00 cash, so plaintiff reluctantly accepted the offer. 
Thereafter, appellant's counsel composed and authored 
the stipulation of the parties dated August 25, 1949 (R. 
16-17) and the decree of the same date ( R. 18 -19) . There-
upon, Mr. O'Donnell, in the presence of defendant's coun-
sel, warned the complaining respondent that if she ever 
allowed defendant to default again and remain in default 
for more than thirty days without advising her attorneys 
to commence action, she must find other counsel and 
defendant's counsel was advised to tell appellant of this 
warning. (The foregoing was presented in uncontested 
statements to the court by counsel, but not placed in the 
transcript by the recorder except as ureading from the files 
and discussion," R. 40.) 
Thereafter, defendant became in default $40.00 and 
respondent commenced this action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH RE-
SPONDENT INTENDS TO RELY FOR 
SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR 
WHEN IT FOUND AND ADJUDICATED DEFEND-
ANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN MODIFYING THE ORDER ENTERED UPON 
AUGUST 25, 1949, AND IN REINSTATING THE 
ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949. 
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3. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF 
A $50.00 COUNSEL FEE UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR 
WHEN IT FOUND AND ADJUDICATED DEFEND-
ANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. 
This point is in answer to ((~oint I" commencing on 
page 5 of appellant's brief and' entitled, uThe District 
Court Erroneously Found and Adjudicated Defendant To 
Be In Contempt of Court." 
. Appellant admits on page 5 of his brief that defendant 
did not ·comply with the District Court order entered 
August 25, 1949 in that he failed to make the payments 
in October and November as required and in that he was 
in default in the sum of ·$20.00 at the time of the hearing. 
We agree that defendant's failure must be willful, in-
tentional or contumacious as he argues on page 5 of his 
brief. However, the record shows ample evidence for .the · 
Court making the :finding of fact as follows: 
((That defendant has willfully refused to comply 
with the Order of this Court." ( R. 27.) 
The record shows that from October 1, 1949 until, and 
including, the day of the hearing on November 15, 1949 
defendant was continuously in default in the payments of 
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the support money for his two children, then age 9 years and 
8 years respectively, under the terms of the decree dated 
August 25, 1949 in sums ranging from $40.00 to never 
less than $20.00 (R. 41-44). Although defendant knew 
since at least November 4, 1949 (R. 24-25) that he must 
appear before the District Court and testify as to why 
he had failed to comply with the order of Court dated 
August 25, 1949 (R. 18-19) requiring him to pay $20.00 
on the 1st and 15th day respectively of each and every 
month, and although defendant was a vete·ran at such 
hearings, and although defendant had the advice of com-
petent counsel who also knew that he must testify regard-
ing his earnings and· expenditures, defendant appeared 
at the hearing without any records of accounts and with-
out any useful knowledge as to his finances and unable 
to testify exactly as to anything pertaining to his finances. 
All of his testimony as to earnings was b-ased upon his own 
guessing and vague estimates (R. 46, R. 48-49). The 
defendant knew the terms of the order (R. 17, R. 43) and, 
therefore, it is incumbent upon him, since he admits (R. 
41-43) that he did not pay in accordance with the terms of 
the order, to show an inability to pay as a matter of 
defence. 
((If the petitioner had knowledge of the con-
tents of the decree, then it must follow as an un-
answerable conclusion that he knew that he had not 
complied with the order. Having knowledge of the 
contents of the decree, it was incumbent upon him 
to show that he had complied therewith if such were 
the fact. Where it is made to appear in the affidavit 
that the party whose duty it was to pay the alimony 
had knowledge of the order re·quiring such payment, 
the fact of payment or inability to pay is a matter of 
defence." Hillyard vs. District Court of Cache 
County, 249 Pac. 806 (Page 807) ; 68 Utah 220. 
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We submit that defendant failed to prove an inability to 
pay by such vague testimony as the following sample: 
MR. WHITE: (CHow much money did you make in 
November, up to the present time, (that is, the 
1st to the 15th of November)? 
MR. BROWN: ~.:I don't have those figures. I have-
n't a summary up the present time. · 
MR. WHITE: uwhat would you estimate your in-
come to be·, since the first of the month? 
MR. BROWN: rr About one hundred dollars to date. 
MR. WHITE: (Cis that your gross income? 
MR. BROWN: uThat is the net." (R. 46). 
and this typical sample of testimony regarding his ex-
penses: 
MR. WHITE: uwhat other expenses? 
MR. BROWN: ttl do not have a full summary. I 
would have to go over my books to get the 
amounts." (R. 49) 
Defendant must be found guilty of willful failure to com-
ply with the order of the Court, since he knew the terms 
of the order and admits that he· did not comply with such 
terms and failed to affirmatively prove his claimed de-
fense of an inability to pay. Not only did defendant fail 
to prove his only defense, but his very testimony showed 
that he had the ability to pay, not only more money than 
he did pay, but in accordance with the terms of the order. 
The defendant testified that he had re-married since 
he was divorced from respondent (R. 46), that he has no 
children by his new wife (R. 54), that his new wife has 
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three children of her own by a previous marriage (R. 54), 
that he is not obligated for the support of his new wife's 
children (R. 55), that he does buy the groceries for his 
new wife and her children (R. 55), that his grocery bill 
varies but ~mounts to approximately $20.00 a week (R. 
48), that he went to two or three shows in September (R. 
49), that it is possible that he went to some movies during 
October (R. 52), and that he sometimes takes his wife 
and her children with him to movies (R. 52). Under 
the terms of the Court order (R. 18-19) defendant was 
to pay respondent $20.00 support money on October 1st 
and $20.-00 more on October 15th, but defendant made 
only one payment during the entire month of O·ctober (R. 
41)-a $20.00 payment on October 30th. Therefore, de-
fendant became in default in his payments on October 1st 
and has never been current since that day. Defendant by 
his testimony, consequently, admits that it is possible that 
he went to some movies during October (R. 52) while in 
default in his payments, and only later after some thought 
does he become even more vague than usual by testifying 
that, ((During October I can't renzember going to a movie." 
(R. 53). If defendant had given respondent only one half 
of the said eighty dollars a month grocery money for the 
use of his own children, he would have been current under 
the terms of the order. If defendant had given respondent 
the money he spent on s4ows he would have ·Conformed 
more to the terms of the decree than he actually did. The 
District Court made findings of fact as follows: 
((That defendant has paid money on other expenses 
and costs that he could have paid as support money 
for said minor children; and that defendant has 
refused and failed to support said minors to his 
maximum ability." (R. 27.) 
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That money defendant possibly spent on a movie while in 
default could have been used to apply on his support money 
payments then in default and would have bought his own 
two children at least a quart of milk. The defendant, by 
the testimony we have quoted heretofore, testified that he 
made $100.00 net during the first fifteen days of Novem-
ber (R. 45), but he only paid respondent, from the $100.0-0 
net that he earned during November up to the day of the 
hearing, the sum of $20.00 on November 7th (R. 42) 
although he was in default at all times during said month. 
The District Court had no choice but to believe that the 
respondent was e·ntitled to a larger share of that $100.00 
in order to support defendant's two little children, and that 
defendant was capable of paying respondent a larger share 
of his November earnings. 
On pages 6 and 7 of appellant's brief, defendant's at-
torneys have made the assumption that defendant's new 
wife and her thre·e childr~n were in financial straits, but 
there is no evidence to substantiate this belief. There is no 
evidence as to the ages of ,the new wife's children or as to 
their respective income or as to whether they are dependent 
upon anyone. Defendant testified that his present wife's 
children are not obligated to him for their support (R. 55). 
The only evidence he offered .regarding the finances of his 
present wife, is that she owns an automobile (R. 53) and 
that she is not employed (R. 53) . Defendant did testify 
that he buys groceries for his present wife and her chil-
dren (R. 48) and that his grocery expenses are about $20.00 
a week (R. 48) ; but even five persons can eat on that much 
money and not have uhungry mouths" (page 6 of his 
brief). Appellant is right in the admission that in legal 
contemplation his first duty is to support his own two 
children. He had no right to place himself in a position 
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deliberately where he could not comply with the order of 
the Court, if he is unable to support his own children as 
a result of marrying another wife who already had three 
children of her own. Van Hoosear vs. Railroad Commis-
sion of California, 207 Pac. 905; 189 Cal. 23 3 (cited with 
approval in Hillyard vs. District Court of Cache County, 
supra). 
The defendant testified (R. 45) that there is no regular 
day upon which he receives any income and that he is self-
employed. Under such circumstances it is incumbent upon 
defendant to arrange his financial affairs in such a manner 
that he is able to pay his support money obligations as each 
becomes due by keeping some money in reserve from higher 
income months over into lower income months. Instead 
of arranging his affairs in this manner during September, 
defendant spent, according to his testimony, all of the 
money that he earned. Thus, he testified that on O·ctober 
1st, 1949 he had no money with which to pay the support 
money payment that became due on that day (R. 43). 
Appellant has the audacity on page 6 of his brief to ,, 
state that he demonstrated his ((good faith" by borrowing 
$500.00 from his father to pay the accrued and unpaid 
support money owing to respondent prior to the order 
dated August 25, 1949. Defendant had been hailed into 
Court on an Order to Show Cause, he had previously been . 
found in contempt of Court at another hearing (R. 10-
12), he had previously been given a suspended jail sentence 
(R. 10-12), he was in default under the terms of the decree 
in the sum of $1,112.50 (R. 13-15), he might well go to 
jail this time, he sa~ an opportunity to settle $1,112.50 
unpaid support money plus court costs including a judg-
ment for attorneys' fees by paying the comparative pittance 
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of $500.00, and he persuaded respondent to take $20.00 a 
month less support money by promising to remain current 
thereafter (R. 16-17, R. 18-19). The defendant made one 
of the best bargains for himself by that day's work that he 
will ever make. Although respondent was enticed to ac-
cept his offer,-when he waived the promise of $500.00 be-
fore her' eyes while knowing how badly their children 
needed the money, she certainly was not satisfied with any 
part of the transaction. If defendant had shown good faith 
at that time, he would have borrowed the $500.00 and 
paid it to apply upon the judgment standing against him 
(R. 10-12) , and not required that the payments be dimin-
ished as an incentive to support his own flesh and blood in 
a lesser manner than the Court had previously adjudicated 
that he was capable of paying. 
The appellant on page 7 of his brief complains that the 
District Court was harsh when it sentenced him to jail for 
the reason that such action would not help his children. 
What other and milder means of enforcing its orders had 
not been exhausted by the Court to no avail? The Court 
had previously found defendant guilty of contempt of 
court (R. 10-12) , it had hailed him before the Court on 
three occasions by orders to show cause (R. 10-12, R. 18-
19, R. 20), it had given him a suspended jail sentence (R. 
1 0-12) , and it had given him a financial incentive to kee·p 
current by consenting that he pay $20.00 less each month 
provided he did not default for thirty days (R. 18-19). The 
District Court had exhausted all other coercive means of 
forcing defendant to comply with its orders, and because 
defendant still was in contempt of its orders it reluctantly 
ordered him incarcerated. 
uEven in an equity case we do not overturn the 
judgment unless it is fairly against the preponder-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ance of the evidence. The writer believes that every 
intendment should be in favor of the trial court, for 
not only does he in a divorce case have the parties 
before him, enabling him to test credibility by 
demeanor, but the conduct and manner of the 
parties in the court room sometimes gives much aid 
in solving who really is at fault." Pinion vs. Pinion, 
67 Pac. (2nd) 268; 92 Utah 262. Huber vs. New-
man, 145 Pac. (2nd) 780; 106 Utah 363. Limb vs. 
Limb, 195 Pac. (2nd) 263; __ Utah--· 
POINT TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
MODIFYING THE ORDER ENTERED UPON AUG-
UST 25,1949, AND IN REINSTATING THE ORDER 
ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949. 
This point is in answer to ((point two" commencing 
on page 7 of appellant's brief and entitled, ((The District 
Court Erred In Modifying the Order Entered August 25, 
1949, And In Reinstating the Order Entered January 6, 
1949." 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the order dated August 25, 
1949 (R. 18-19) read as follows: , 
u3. That the order of the Court, entered in the 
above entitled case on the 27th day of June, 1947, 
as modified by the order of the court entered in the 
above entitled case on the 6th day of January, 1949, 
requiring the defendant to pay to t~e plaintiff the 
sum of $60.00 per month for the care and support 
of the two minor ~children of the plaintiff and the 
defendant be- and the same is hereby modified and 
henceforth the defendant shall be required to pay 
to the plaintiff the sum of $40.00 per month in two 
11 
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installments, to-wit: $20.00 on the 1st of each 
month and $20.00 on the 15th of each month, with 
the first payment to be made on or before Sep-
tember 1, 1949. 
cc4. It is further ordered that in the event the 
defendant shall default in the payment of the sum 
of $40.00 per month as herein provided, and shall 
remain in default for a period of thirty days, then 
the provision of the decree heretofore entered re-
quiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the 
sum of $60.00 per month for the care and support 
of the two minor children of the parties shall be 
automatically reinstated." 
The intent of the parties, the intent of the Court and the 
meaning of paragraph 4 was that if defendant defaulted 
in the payment of the support money under the terms of 
paragraph 3 of the order, and remained in default even one 
cent for thirty consecutive days, the provisions of the 
previous decree requiring defendant to pay $60.00 a month 
be reinstated. Since appellant and defendant's attorneys 
worded the written stipulation and order, they are respon-
sible for any ambiguity in the same. 
The plan was suggested by Mr. Clyde for the sole 
purpose of providing the consistently-defaulting defendant 
with an incentive to remain current in his support money 
obligation~, and Mr. Clyde ttsold" the plan to respondent 
by assuring her that he had used it successfully on other 
, defaulting fathers and by pointing out that she was not 
receiving $60.00 a month anyway due to the defendant's 
failure to pay and due to the expense of collecting default 
payments by legal action. However, the interpretation that 
appellant and his counsel now wish to use for paragraph 
four would certainly encourage defendant to remain in 
12 
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default $39.99 at all times, and would absolutely defeat 
the very intent of the plan to encourage· defendant to re-
main current. 
The defendant was current on September 30, 1949 in 
his payments under the terms of the order dated August 
25, 1949, and, as shown by the stipulation of the parties in 
open Court (R. 41-42) he only made two payments there-
after, one for $20.00 on October 30th and the other for 
$20.00 on November 7th, 1949. Consequently, on October 
1st, under the terms of paragraph three of the order, de-
fendant became in default that payment of $20.00; he 
remained thus in default until the October 15th payment 
also became due so that he the·n owed $40.00; on October 
30th he paid $20.00 on the debt leaving a balance of $20.00 
owing; on November 1st another payment became due 
and he again owed $40.00; and, after this action was com-
menced and he was served with a citation, he paid the 
other $20.00 leaving him in default in the sum of $20.00 
at the time of the hearing, since the November 15th pay-
ment, due on the day of the hearing, was not in default 
until the last second of that day. On page 8 of his brief 
appellant argues that udefendant was never in default in 
any amount for a period of thirty days." We in turn ask, 
at any time in what single day between October 2nd, 1949 
and the time of the hearing on November 15th, 1949 was 
defendant not in default at least $20.00? The defendant 
himself answered this question at the hearing as follows: 
MR. O'DONNELL: c:c:You have been in arrears at, 
all times since October 1 until now?" 
MR. BROWN: uYes." (R. 44.) 
We compute that there are forty-five days that defendant 
13 
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was in default before the hearing, from October 2nd to 
November 15th, 1949. 
Appellant first argues in his brief that he must be in 
default $40.00 before the prior decree can be reinstated 
and at the end of this particular point two he apparently 
argues that he must be in default one particular installment 
for thirty days before said order is to be reinstated. How-
ever, paragraph four of the order never mentions install-
ments, nor did the Court or the parties consider such a 
fatuous plan when the order was rendered. Paragraph four 
' was planned to provide the parties' children with necessary 
money, and the children cannot eat by accounting entries. 
This latter version of the appellant's interpretation of para-
graph four would also encourage him to remain in default 
one installment at all times, and thus again defeat the 
very purpose of the plan. 
The District Court properly ruled as follows (R. 55-
56): 
uThe Court is further of the opinion that para-
graph 4 of the Decree, entitled c:c:Order," dated 
August 25, 1949, signed by Judge Roald A. Hogen-
son, covers this situation, and that the meaning of 
it is that on the failure to pay a sum of forty dollars 
per month ·over a period of time, as the evidence 
shows here, is enough to revive the old provision, 
and reinstate the requirement that he pay sixty dol-
lars per month. The Court :finds that the Defendant 
is in default, and the old Decree is reinstated, to pay 
sixty dollars per month-thirty dollars December 
1, and thirty dollars December 15, and each 1st and 
15th thereafter.'' 
and the District Court made the following :finding of fact 
(R. 28): 
14 
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ttThat the proper interpretation of the Order of 
this Court' J1erein dated August 25th, 1949 and 
designated as paragraph four is that the former 
Decree requiring defendant to pay $60.00 a month 
instead of only $40.00 shall be reinstated provided 
defendant remains in default in the payn1ent of any 
part of the support money payments for thirty days 
and not merely if defendant defaults in the paytnent 
of $40.00 for thirty days. That defendant has been 
in default in the payment of support money for a 
period in excess of thirty days." 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF A 
$50.00 COUNSEL FEE UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES. 
This point is in answer to upoint three" commencing 
on page 9 of appellant's brief and entitled, ((The District 
Court Erred In Ordering Defendant To Pay Plaintiff A 
$50.00 Counsel Fee Under the Circumstances." 
The parties stipulated, through their counsel, in open 
Court that $50.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee for the 
Court to order defendant to pay plaintiff for the use and 
benefit of her counsel for their services at the hearing, 
providing that it was proper for the Court to order the 
defendant to pay plaintiff any attorney's fees therein 
R. 55). 
Contrary to appellant's argument on page 9 of his 
brief, he was $40.00 in arrears, instead of $20.00, when this 
action was commenced and when he was served with a 
citation on November 4, 1949 (R. 25, R. 41-42); but he 
paid $20.00 on November 7, 1949 (R. 42), or three days 
after service of the citation upon him, and thus was in 
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arrears $20.00 at the time of the hearing. The citation 
would have been properly brought though at the time it 
was issued he had been only $20.00 in default. 
The respondent was deprived ot over $650.00 by de-
laying in pressing her rights in Court in the past, as we 
have heretofore explained. When respondent allowed the 
unpaid support money to increase and accumulate, de-
fendant required her to settle for much less than half the 
amount due by arguing that he could never possibly ac-
cumulate sufficient money to pay the accrued debt. Now, 
that respondent has learned her lesson, defendant has the 
audacity to complain that she should wait for him to get 
right back in the same hopeless condition that she relieved 
him from before. 
Next appellant complains that he was not given the 
courtesy of a letter (Pages 9 and 1 0 of his brief) before 
this action was commenced. Defendant had been sent let-
ters on previous occasions, had been telephoned, had been 
served with orders to show cause, had been hailed into 
Court, had been found in contempt of Court, had been 
given a suspended jail sentence, all to no avail. Further, 
defendant's counsel had heard Mr. O'Donnell warn re-
spondent to find. new attorneys if she allowed defendant 
to default more than thirty days without advising them 
to commence an action, and defendant's attorney had been 
told to tell defendant of this advice. From past experience 
respondent and her counsel knew that letters have no effect 
on defendant. We do not need to apologize for not send-
ing defendant a letter, for the law does not require one 
to do a useless 'act. The defendant's past history must be 
considered while judging whether the respondent and the 
District Court acted harshly herein. 
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The defendant on pages 9 and 10 of his brief argues 
that the $500.00 that he paid respondent in August should· 
have sufficiently satisfied respondent so that she should not 
have commenced this action. The defendant maintains 
that the payment of $500.00 places the respondent in a 
position to pay her own legal expenses. The $500.00 paid 
in accordance with the aforesaid agreement satisfied $1,-
112.50 unpaid support money and thus paid over eighteen 
months accumulated unpaid support mone·y and brought 
the payments current to the end of August, 1949. Surely 
the defendant cannot expect the same $500.00 to support 
the two children for a longer period of time than the said 
eighteen months, nor can defendant expect respondent 
to have sufficient of that money left to pay Court costs and 
legal expenses made necessary by his further delinquencies .. 
The respondent had been temporarily unemployed, one of 
the parties' children has a heart ailment, and the respondent 
has other expenses which have been set forth in her affidavit 
in support of a motion to require defendant to pay at-
torneys' fees and certain costs. The respondent commenced 
this action by an affidavit of impecuniosity (R. 3 2) , be-
cause she had no money with which to pay even the costs 
in the District Court. However, the appellant frequently 
concedes in his brief that the respondent and their children 
are in :financial need, so we shall not further stress to the 
Court the impossibility of respondent paying her own ex-
penses. Davidson vs. Munsey, 180 Pac. 743; 29 Utah 181. 
Appellant was in arrears $40.00 under the terms of the 
order (R. 18-19) when the action was commenced, he was 
$20.00 in arrears at the time of the hearing, the District 
Court found that his default was willful, so it properly 
ordered him to pay the costs and expenses incurred, which 
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includes a reasonable attorneys' fee. Foreman vs. Foreman, 
176 Pac (2nd) 144; 111 Utah 72. 
What did respondent's attorneys accomplish by in-
stituting this action? By instituting this action, defendant 
( 1) was probably persuaded to pay that $20.00 payment 
three days after he was served with the citation; (2) the 
prior order was reinstated and the defendant was ordered 
to pay $20.00 a month more support money than he had 
been paying; and, ( 3) most important of all, perhaps the 
defendant will be convinced finally that the respondent 
and the Court insist that defendant consistently and reg-
ularly help support his two children. 
The appellant suggests that the Supreme Court dis-
courage mothers from commencing actions to require fa-
thers who default in support money payments to comply 
with the order of the District Court, until such time as 
the unpaid installments accumulate to an important 
amount. The policy suggested by appellant would encour-
age laxity upon the part of the t;nothers, by affirmatively 
discouraging them from enforcing their rights. The ap-
pellant does not suggest how the children are to eat during 
the interim while the unpaid installments accumulate to 
an important amount. Unfortunately, too many fathers 
are presently using the plan of the appellant, and allowing 
the unpaid support money' payments to accumulate to 
an amount which they can not possibly pay, then settling 
the accumulated account for a much smaller lump sum 
payment. From the experience of respondent's counsel, 
we can collect $20.00 from any one much easier than we 
can collect $1,112.50 from the same person. 
The respondent has been too lenient in the past and 
this attitude cost her over $650.00. Furthermore, why 
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should the defendant be allowed to continue to pay a lesser 
sum each month as support money, when he fails to remain 
current which was the uconsideration" for these lowe·r 
payments? The respondent agreed to accept a lesser sum 
in the expectation that defendant would pay consistently 
and regularly thereafter. 
Respondent's counsel resent the implication on page 
10 of appellant's brief that the expectation of counsel fees 
might have influenced them to commence this action so 
promptly. We remind appellant that in the past he has 
never paid respondent's attorne·ys one cent in attorneys' 
fees, although he was twice ordered to do so by the Court 
(R. 10-12; R. 29-30). Further, we have commenced and 
pressed this matter without receiving any compensation 
from respondent. The respondent has no money or reason-
able means of paying her counsel for defending this appeal, 
and appellant should be required to pay a reasonable at-
torney's fee in the amount of at least $100.00 for the 
services of respondent's counsel in defending this appeal, 
and also costs incurred herein. 
CONCLUSIO·N 
We, therefore, respectfully conclude that the judg-
ment of the District Court should be sustained, and that 
the respondent should be awarded costs and attorneys' fees 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELDRED J. WILDE 
JOHN HAYS O'DONNELL, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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